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chapter One 
INTRODUCTION
The history of the relationship between Aboriginal 
people in Canada and Euro-Canadians has been vast and 
interesting. In the beginning, when settlers were few, the 
relationship was mutually beneficial. However, as more and 
more Europeans came to this part of the world. Aboriginal 
people became less important, both in terms of their 
economic contribution and with respect to the politics of 
this country. Increasingly, they existed apart from 
mainstream Canadian life and predictably, the relationship 
eventually broke down so completely that the cultural 
existence of Aboriginal people was threatened.
This paper will examine one particular aspect of the 
deterioration of this relationship; a case which occurred in 
the Treaty 3 area in Northwestern Ontario between the years 
1905 and 1920. The Ontario and Minnesota Power Company, with 
the approval of the government of Ontario flooded a portion 
of an Ojibwa reserve located near Fort Frances. The Ontario 
government, through ignorance or racism, or both chose to 
ignore and then obstruct Native treaty rights in favour of 
powerful business interests that promised "progress" in the 
region. Before an analysis of this event can be undertaken
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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however, one must provide a context for evolution of Native 
and non-Native relations in Canada,
One of the earliest alliances between Native and non- 
Native people centred around the fur trade. Indeed, fur was 
the method, as Bruce Trigger notes, by which Henry IV of 
France hoped to colonize New France. The king granted 
wealthy merchants "an exclusive right to trade with the 
Indians in return for establishing French settlement 
t h e r e . F r o m  the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, 
many Europeans were captivated by the wealth which could be 
gained from furs.' Because of the vital role in the fur 
trade played by Native people they were able to exert some 
pressure and influence in the system.^
Bruce Trigger, Natives and Newcomers'. Canada's Heroic Age 
Reconsidered. (Montreal and Kingston: McGi11-Queen’s University 
Press, 1985) p.172.
‘ In the journals of both David Thompson and Alexander 
MacKenzie we get an impression of the sense of adventure as well 
as a description of the sort of relationship which existed 
between Europeans and Native people.
David Thompson, Travels in Western North America, 1784-1812. ed. 
Victor Hopwood (Toronto: McMillan of Canada, 1971).
Alexander MacKenzie, The Journal and Letters of Sir Alexander 
MacKenzie, e d . W. Kaye Lamb (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970).
 ̂ See, for example:
A.J. Ray, Indians and the Fur Trade (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1974).
Jennifer Brown, Strangers in Blood:Fur Trade Company Families in 
the Indian Country (Vancouver: University of Vancouver Press, 
1980).
Sylvia Van Kirk's Many Tender Ties'.Women in the Fur Trade Society 
in Western Canada 1670-1870 (Winnipeg: Watson and Dwyer Ltd. 
1980).
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In the Treaty 3 area, Ojibwa traders were involved with 
the North West Company in various capacities and brought 
their furs to the post at Fort William. The relationship was 
an economically beneficial one for both groups; the Ojibwa 
received European goods and the traders got the fur.'*
Indeed, the great Canadian political economist Harold Innis 
assigns much importance to this interaction, attributing to 
it the early development of Canada.^
This advantageous relationship had begun to alter as 
the fur trade declined and more settlers came into the area. 
Beginning with the Royal Proclamation of .1763 and continuing 
with the British North America Act of 1867, the government 
gradually succeeded in transforming a sovereign Aboriginal 
people, who had personal and cultural autonomy and who also 
possessed the freedom to negotiate such economic liaisons 
with non-Native people as they wished, into a subject people 
with limited rights and diminished power over their own 
affairs.
J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of 
Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1989) p. 41. Miller explains that some trade goods 
actually undermined the culture of Aboriginal people, but that 
others were used to enhance traditional beliefs.
 ̂ In the landmark work by Harold Innis the importance of the 
fur trade to the development of this nation is analyzed.
Harold Innis, The Fur Trade In Canada: An Introduction to 
Canadian Economic Trade to 1835 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1930).
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The Royal Proclamation was clearly designed to protect
Native people from outsiders; for example, land could not be
sold to unscrupulous traders, and could only be transferred
through the Crown. The profits from such land transfers
were intended, at least, to benefit Native people. However,
up to this time. Aboriginal people had effectively
maintained control over their "internal social affairs as
well as their external diplomatic and military
relationships"^ and were treated, more or less, as sovereign
nations. They were also viewed by the government of Upper
Canada in the British, as valued allies in constant struggle
against the United States, established in 1783. For example.
Native people played a vital role in the defeat of American
forces during the War of 1812. As Robert Allen points out
in His Majesty's Indian Allies:
The successful defence of the province in 1812 
was the result of the bold offensive strategy 
of Isaac Brock, "the hero and saviour of Upper 
Canada’ in traditional Canadian historical 
accounts of the War of 1812. Yet the victories 
at Mi chi 1imackinac, Detroit, and Queenston 
Heights were all determined in large measure 
by the physical presence or active military 
use of significant numbers of Indian allies.
Bruce W. Hodgins, John S. Milloy, Kenneth J. Haddock, 
"Aboriginal Self-Government: Another Level or Order in Canadian 
and Australian Federalism?" in Federalism in Canada -and 
Australia: Historical Perspectives 1920-1588. Peterborough: The 
Frost Centre for Canadian Heritage and Development Studies, Trent 
University, 1989, p.466.
 ̂ Robert S. Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies: British 
Indian Policy in thf Defence of Canada, 1774-1815 (Toronto:
Dudurn Press, 1992) p.140.
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Although Native people were effectively made wards of
the Crown under tlie* Proclamation Act and were no longer
treated as sovereign people, they still held some rights and
could participate somewhat in the decision making process.
For example, prior to 1860
it was tribal councils who decided the degree 
and direction of culture change: whether schools 
would be allowed on the reserves, the rate and 
type of agricultural or resource development, 
and the extent to which Indian finances, 
composed of the annual payments received by 
the tribes for lands surrendered to the Crowp, 
would be devoted co projects of development.^
However, this sort of independence was T>,ot to last.
This type of constitutional relationship, which was designed 
to work on a nation to nation basis, was not able to survive 
after Confederation. Section 91(24) of the British North 
America Act resulted in the termination of traditional 
Native government; in effect the British Crown turned over 
control of Native people to the new government of Canada. 
This move meant that Aboriginal people were forced to agree 
to whatever laws the Canadian governments chose to make for 
them.'
The Indian Act of 1876 was a progeny of section 
91(24) of the British North American Act and was established 
to consolidate all the previous laws that had existed which
John Milloy,"The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy 
and Constitutional Change," As Long as the Sun Shines and Water 
Flows, Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier, eds. (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1983) p.57.
 ̂ CP Sessional Paper no. 50, 12 February 1909.
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governed white-Aboriginal relations. One of the main 
intentions of the Act was to change Native attitudes through 
education and e ,franchisement, concerning communal land, and 
to eventually assimilate Native people into non-Native 
culture.*^ Certainly the Indian Act of; .1876 was meant to 
"civilize" Native p e o p l e . I t  also quite markedly changed 
the nature of the Native-white relationship by explicitly 
making Natives wards of the state. In short the relationship 
went from being one of relative equality to being one of a 
parent-child nature. For example, two important earlier 
acts, one passed in 1850 and the other in 1857, illustrate 
the sort of legislation that was combined to form the Indian 
Act. The 1850 Act assumed that the government had broad 
powers, even to the point of defining who was or was not 
Indian. This particular Act was highly intrusive because 
it meant that the government now had the power to pronounce 
non-Native people as NatJ.ve, and conversely, Native people
Some of the examples that illustrate both the effects of 
such assimilation tactics and the rationale behind them. See John 
L. Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline 
History of Canada's Indian Policy," The Western Canadian Journal 
of Anthropology 6 (197 6).
CP Sessional Paper no. 50, 12 February 1909. Here the comments 
made by Chief Justice Davies are particularly valuable.
See also, Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada's First Nations: A 
History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1992)
** See Dickason, p. 284
19 J.R. Miller Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, p.109. In
Canada East the Act provided a definition of Indian that not only
included those who had Aboriginal ancestors, but also anyone who
chose to live with a band on a reserve.
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as non-Native. Certainly this was a bizarre situation over 
which Aboriginal people themselves had no control, and it 
had disastrous implications for them. For example, Native 
women who married non-Native men were forced to live off the 
reserve and their children lost their status as Native 
people. Similarly, the 1S57 "Act for the Gradual 
Civilization of the Indian Tribes in the Canadas" was 
designed to encourage Native people to cease being Native 
and to enfranchise them as full citizens in the non-Native 
community. Of course, what was actually expected, was that 
they would eventually lose all special status or Treaty 
rights.
By 1369, the Dominion of Canada acquired the rights to 
the old Hudson Bay territories in the west, finally taking 
possession in 1870. Native people were well aware that the 
only protection they would receive against the encroachment 
of non-Native civilization was to make treaties with the 
government.*^ Still "any" agreement would not suffice, a 
fact brought out by the drawn-out negotiations that resulted 
in Treaty 3 in 1873. The Treaty, covering approximately 
55,000 square miles in what is now Northwestern Ontario, was
*" Robert Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in Upper Canada, 
1815-1830," As Long As the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader 
In Canadian Native Studies, eds. Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine 
Lussier (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983), 
Surtees acknowledges that Native people in the west had a 
legitimate fear of how Natives south of the border were treated 
by the American government and were afraid that without strong 
treaties the same sort of abuses would happen to them at the 
hands of the Canadian government.
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believed to be necessary in order to permit the government 
of Canada to complete its nation-building project.''
Tentative discussions between the local Ojibwa and Ottawa 
began in 1869, but were not completed for four years.
An example of the difficulties encountered during the 
meetings is demonstrated in an 1872 letter written by Treaty 
3 negotiators to the Secretary of State for the Provinces, 
Joseph Howe. The officials complained that they had not 
been successful in negotiating with the Ojibwa west of Lake 
Superior because the Indians were angry that some of their 
land had been taken by the construction of roads, and that 
timber had been cut .from their forests for fuel for steamers 
and for building.'^ The lack of trust evidenced during these 
negotiations stemmed from different white and Native 
priorities and agendas. As noted above, the letter wanted 
some assurances (although not at my cost) their way of life 
would be protected against an influx of white settlers, 
probably having in mind here the example of their relations 
to the immediate south in the United States. Conversely, the 
former wanted the Treaty for political and naticn-bui1 ding 
reasons, and also for any raw materials, like lumber, that 
might be found in the region. The conflict inherent in the 
motivation of each side for an agreement was not easy to
Not everyone saw it this way. Some believed it to be 
premature. See Irving Papers Box 40, package 38, item 16.
15 .Irving Papers, Box 30, package 36, items 1-4.
. ■ I'l/'
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resolve and in this case and others, the economic, 
political, and potential military power of the government in 
Ottawa won out.
The government relied on the recommendations of 
departmental agents, and uhe wishes of Native people were 
secondary to the attitude of policy makers like Treaty 3 
commissioner Alexander Morris who had envisioned a 
collective tribal authority, under the control of a strong 
central government. For reasons such as these, the treaties 
were not negotiated differently with respect to what suited 
each territorial group, but rather according to an evolving 
central policy.
Eventually it became the responsibility of the 
Department of Indian Affairs, formally established in 1880 
but which remained with the Department of the Interior until 
1936, to oversee the implementation of the agreements that 
had been reached through the various treaties. Initially,
For example historians, judges and government policy 
makers and critics have all been interested in the problems 
associated with conflicts over resource use and Native lands. 
Some examples are the following.
Thomas Berger, Northern Frontier. Northern Homeland: The Report 
of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (Toronto: James Lorimer 
& Co. Publishers, 1977).
Peter A. Gumming and Neil H. Mickenberg eds.. Native Rights In 
Canada (Toronto: General Publishing Co. Limited, 1972).
Anthony Hall, Aboriginal Resource Use In Canada: Historical and 
Legal Aspects (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1991). 
John Leslie and Ron Maguire eds,. The Historical Development of 
the Indian Act Ottawa: Government Publication.
Milloy, p.57.
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the Department was concerned more with protecting Native 
people from p o t e n tial ly  dangerous situations as, for 
example, from the evils of prostitution and from being 
cheated out of their property and material possessions. 
Unfortunately, this paternalistic attitude came to function 
more as an instrument of domination than as one of 
salvation.
One of the main goals of the department then, was to
operate as guardians for Aboriginal people and subsequently
to work, as the department perceived it, on their behalf.
One problem with this arrangement was that it was difficult,
for the Department of Indian Affairs to fulfil its mandate,
that is, to represent both the Native and non-Native
communities. Indeed, it found this to be increasingly
difficult. As time passed, this conundrum was resolved in
favour of the non-Native side. As James Frideres wrote in
Native People in Canada, by the turn of the century
a new perspective on Native Canadians began to 
emerge. A tremendous influx of white settlers had 
entered the west and the Native population began 
to be viewed as a barrier to Canada's general 
progress.... As a result...amendments to the
For a fuller understanding of how this process which 
began as benevolent power became an entrenched systematic 
dictatorship of Native people by various government agencies see 
the following.
John Leslie and Ron Maguire, eds.. The Historical Development of 
the Indian Act. Treaties and Historical research Centre, Indian 
and Northern Affairs, 1978.
Allan G. Harper, "Canada's Indian Administration: Basic Concepts 
and Objectives," America Indicena 5 (April 1945). Bruce Clark, 
Indian Title in Canada (Toronto: Carswell Co., 1987).
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Indian Act during the early 20thC began to focus 
on the conditions under which land could be taken 
away from Natives.*'
In the analysis of the following Treaty 3 case, one may 
see how this dialectic was resolved. The Department of 
Indian Affairs, for its Native charges in the Fort Frances 
area, came into conflict with powerful economic interests 
that promised "progress." It also came into conflict with 
the government of Ontario, under whose constitutional 
jurisdiction the Ontario and Minnesota Power Company fell.^^ 
As will be seen, the Department of Indian Affairs, when 
confronted with a formidable opponent with Queen's Park on 
its side, eventually caved in to the pressure exerted and 
accepted a situation which was not in the interests of its 
Native wards.
This predicament was particularly evident in the Treaty 
3 region because economic development, which was 
predominantly connected with the mining and forest 
industries,*' occurred frequently on or near reserve lands. 
Can a department serve two masters? Clearly not, and
James Frideres, Native Peoples in Canada (Toronto: 
Prentice-Kal1, 1983) p.25.
For the Ontario government. Native people posed as 
obstacles to "progress" were nothing more than ciphers who had to 
be moved out of the way.
H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development; Forests, Mines 
and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1949-1941 (Toronto: McMillan 
of Canada, 1974), p.25.
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therein lay the dilemma facing the Department of Indian 
Affairs and Native people in that region.'^
■ For various reports which illustrate the difficulty 
Native people face in maintaining the rights given to them by 
treaty in the Treaty 3 area and other areas in western Canada see 
the following.
James Waldram, The Impact of Hydro-Electric Development Upon a 
Northern Manitoba Native Community (University Microfilms 
International, 1983).
Anthony Long S Menno Boldt, eds.. Governments in Conflict 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).
Paul Driben & Donald Auger, The Generation of Power and Fear: The 
Little Jackfish River Hydroelectric Project a.nd Mhitesand Indian 
Band Lakehead Centre for Northern Studies and Research Report 
Series No.3, 1989.
Melvin M. Crystal, "Report of Treaty and Aboriginal Rights and 
Government of Ontario Native Affairs Policy of Lands and Natural 
Resources." Ministry of Natural Resources Report, May 31, 1986. 
Thomas Berger, Northern Frontier. Northern Homeland; The Report 
of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (Toronto: James Lorimer 
& Co. Publishers, 1977)
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chapter Two 
THE TREATY î’0.3 SITUATION
The early history involving conflict between the 
Ontario government and the Dominion of Canada, which became 
known as the Ontario boundary dispute, foreshadows the later 
difficulties over reserve lands and resources on reserve 
1ands.
The territory which was involved in the controversy was 
originally part of the land controlled by the Hudson’s Bay 
Company. However, there had been considerable movement on 
the part of the Canadian government to acquire those lands 
for itself, ending the charter which gave the Hudson's Bay 
Company a monopoly which had existed since the time of 
Charles II. The British government was able to pressure the 
two parties to an agreement for a cash settlement and 
specific l a n d s , a n d  in 1870, the government of Canada was 
finally given the authority to administer this region. An 
interim decision was made which created a Northwestern 
boundary for the province of Ontario adjacent to the 
Northwest Territories, but excluding the lands that would 
become part of Treaty 3. The federal government, which had
Morris Zaslow, Profiles of A History, p.108
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jurisdiction under section 91(24) of the British North 
America Act to make decisions for ’’Indians and lands 
reserved for Indians” subsequently negotiated Treaty 3.
The federal government did this on its own, with no input 
from the province of Ontario, even though Ontario had made 
it clear that it felt that the district in question, the 
Lake of the Woods area, belonged to the province.■* This 
controversy led to a lawsuit the St. Catharine’s Milling 
Case^', which helped to expedite the decision which 
ultimately awarded the territory to the province, rather 
than the Dominion, in 1889.
The boundary dispute caused problems for Native people 
because the Treaty 3 negotiations resulted in a 
comparatively, generous land allotment, the territory not to 
"exceed in all one square mile for each family of five, or 
in that proportion for larger or smaller families.”'' Not 
only did this represent an entitlement about four times the 
maximum land allocation awarded in Treaties 1 and 2, but 
also set an example for future treaty negotiations. The 
size of this allotment proved problematic for land conscious 
Ontario, and was therefore readjusted following the 1889
7* David McKab, "The Administration of Treaty 3: The 
Location of the Boundaries of Treaty 3 Indian Reserves In 
Ontario, 1873-1915," As Long As the Sun Shines. p.146.
Anthony Hall, Aboriginal resource Use In 
Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects (Winnipeg; University of 
Manitoba Press, 1991), p.280.
McNab, "The Administration of Treaty 3," p.147.
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decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
which finally settled the question of the boundary dispute 
in favour of Ontario.
Land disputes were complex and involved both levels of 
government, different interpretations of treaty rights, and 
opposing views concerning the future worth of the land 
balanced against the immediate welfare of the Aboriginal 
people who were directly affected by any change to the size 
of reserve lands. While understanding that the demands of 
Indian culture required a two-fold use of the land, farming 
lands for summer habitation and wild lands for fall and 
winter hunting, the government was also cognizant of the 
fact that expanding settlement would put ever-increasing 
pressure on any lands set aside for Native people. Lands 
particularly susceptible to be taken over by the government 
for reasons other than for reserves were the so called wild 
lands, because the government saw these reserves as 
underdeveloped or set aside for limited land use.
There was much concern during the ongoing boundary 
dispute finally settled in 1889 between the governments of 
Ontario and Canada over the location of reserve lands and 
future economic development; it was felt that "the 
settlement of Crown (Ontario) lands would be retarded or 
underdeveloped indefinitely by the location of those Indian
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Reserves."'"' It is interesting to note that even though the 
Indians insisted that they themselves choose the land set 
aaide for them as part of the Treaty 3 agreement, these 
reserves were re-organized, without their input, by a 
federal-provincial pact. The Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council gave the land under question, the north-west 
portion of what is now Ontario to the Ontario government in 
a decision rendered in 1888. This ruling meant that 
Aboriginal people lost the use of the so called wild lands 
near the Rainy River. Subsequently, their highly desirable 
river front property was now free to be "opened up" for 
white settlement.''
The Native people involved were given no real choice 
but to surrender their land. The government sought to force 
the Long Sault Band to surrender its reserve and have its 
members join the Manitou Rapids band. However, no 
amalgamation was possible because Long Sault was afraid of 
being dominated by the other band, whose members were, of 
course, the original inhabitants of that particular reserve. 
In correspondence between Indian Agent Wright of Kenora and 
the Deputy Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs, D.C.
Lise C. Hansen, "Research Report: The Rainy River Indian 
Band Land Claim to the Land Identified as Long Sault Indian 
Reserves #12 and #13 Little Forks Indian Reserve #10 The 
Bishop Indian Reserve #14 Paskonkin Indian Reserve #15 and Wild 
Lands Indian Reserve # 15M." Ministry of Natural Resources 
Report, December 31, 1986, p.24
Ibid. , p.35.
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Scott, it can be shown that both officials knew that the
bands were not in favour of any form of amalgamation because
of their separate identities, and that the federal
government was prepared to force the surrender if necessary.
Scott wrote to Wright that
Consolidation of the Indian Bands will make
for progress and the Indian will receive the
benefits of the lands sold...[but] if the 
Rainy River Indian Bands continue to block 
the surrender the government of Canada might 
be compelled to carry out arrangements by 
mutual consent as they have the undoubted 
power to do."
It seems curious that the federal government would
resort to threats, when in fact it was supposed to fill the
role of protector of Indic.n rights. From 1394 to 1913 the 
federal government and the provincial government of Ontario 
were involved in negotiations to settle the location of the 
boundaries of reserve land in the Treaty 3 region. Part of 
that settlement included that 20,672 acres of reserve land 
would be identified as superfluous and therefore needed to 
be reallocated for other uses." Finally it was decided 
that Ontario would confirm the location of the reserves if 
the federal government could secure the surrender of these 
Rainy River band reserves.
We must ask then, in what way is it fair to say that 
Ontario would be willing to confirm the reserves, if the
Ibid. . p .  37
McNab, "The Administration of Treaty 3" p.149.
\\
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concern for the future developmental potential of the land 
was more important? The Indian people realized the difficult 
position that they were in and it is interesting to hote 
that the Long Sault band sent a petition of complaint to the 
Department of Indian Affairs because "they now believed 
Indian Agent Wright’s promise to them for money for houses, 
cattle, horses and a school house and eighty acres for each 
family on Manitou Rapids Indian Reserve #11 were all 
lies."^' However, despite the concerns of the members of the 
band, the wishes of the government prevailed, and by March 
1915, all of the reserves in this district were duly 
surrendered to the government of Ontario.
The 1915 legislation also contained another important
reversal. The reciprocal legislation of the Parliament of
Canada and the legislature of the province of Ontario in
1891 which had confirmed which lands and waters belonged to
the Indian reserves in the Treaty 3 area had stated that
the land covered with water lying between the 
projecting headlands of any lake ot sheets of 
water, not wholly surrounded by an Indian 
Reserve shall be deemed to form part of such 
Reserve including Islands... and shall not be 
subject to the common public right of fishery 
by others than Indians of the Band to which 
the reserve belongs.
9fl Hansen, "Rainy River Indian Band Land Claim," p.38 
McNab, "The Administration of Treaty 3," p.153.
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The 1915 legislation changed that, depriving Natives of the 
water. The needs of the Native people would become 
contingent upon the needs of other Ontarians.
In a letter from Aubrey White to D.C. Scott on December
4, 1914 it is evident that the provincial government had
made considerable plans with respect to making use of the
natural resources, in this case water, which were ostensibly
part of the Indian reserves land. As he wrote,
When I came to read clause 4 [of the proposed 
federal-provincial agreement of 1913] it 
struck me that clause left the door open for 
all kinds of disputes and misunderstandings 
hereafter...This provision is very far 
reaching and might seriously cripple our 
action with respect to the application of 
Winnipeg for leave to take its water supply 
from Shoal Lake, and I think you agree with 
me that there is much room otherwise for 
future trouble under the clause as it 
reads, because in some of the reserves I find 
there are rivers of considerable size running 
through them and it surely never was intended 
that lands under a river should belong to the 
Indians. I find also that there are some 
water powers lying within the boundaries of 
reserves... and some reserves border on the 
lake in such a way, that, under the language 
with respect to headlands, a large number of 
islands woul^ become the property of the 
Indians....
Surprisingly, given Scott’s position as "protector" of 
Native rights and therefore treaties, he agreed with White's 
assessment and both men thought it better for the government 
to renege on the 1891 agreement.
Gwynneth C.D. Jones, "Research Report: The Big Grassy 
Indian Band Land Claim to the Bed and Waters of the Big Grassy 
River Adjacent to Big Grassy Indian Reserve #35G." Ministry of 
Natural Resources Report, July 30, 1986, p.14.
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In the 1919 correspondence between R.S. Mackenzie, 
Indian Agent at Kenora and J D .  McLean, secretary for the 
Department of Indian Affairs it is clear that the town of 
Kenora and its agent wanted all of the Rat Portage Indian 
Reserve #38B which had not been previously surrendered, 
including the land along Matueson Bay.'* It is incredible 
that a request for Indian land surrender by a town made on 
May 5, 1919 involving more than five thousand acres of lake 
front property was achieved by June 2, 1919, less than one 
month later. That was in large part because the residents 
of Kenora were interested in the development of recreational 
facilities and cottages along Lake of the Woods.
A letter dated July 3,.1919 to McLean, from a number of
Native residents of the reserve, George and Fred Skeet and
Rubert Tay1er reveals the rest of the story.
We...want to ask the Department if Mr.
MacKen[zie] Our [sic] Indian Agent was realy 
[sic] instructed to sell our reserve 
wheth[er] we were willing or not. It 
is what he told us, that we would los[e] 
everything if we did not consent to sell it
and that we had to sell it right away we did
not have time to consult our chief [missing] 
delay till next treaty time but the answer 
was no you have to [missing] it right now or 
it will be taken away from you no price was 
fixed and we had to say yes or no and he said 
we would have nothing if we said no but now 
we have thought of it and we cannot belie[ve] 
the Department has given such orders if these 
orders have been given we would like at least
Ibid. , p. 17.
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to know wh^t we will be [missing] and will be 
satisfied.
From the report it is evident that the Indian band 
received no response. The Native people hired a lawyer to 
look into the matter and on July 23, 1920 a letter was sent 
from their law firm to the Superintendent General of the 
Department of Indian Affairs forwarding a complaint by the 
Rat Portage Indian Band with respect to the 1919 
surrender."' However, there appears to have been little 
real action taken by the court and McLean simply responded 
to the inquiry by stating that "this surrender was taken by 
the local Indian Agent, and was regularly obtained in 
accordance with the requirements of the Indian A c t .
Another issue that clearly demonstrated the Ontario 
government's attitude relates to the payment of annuities to 
the Natives of Treaty 3. The government of Ontario was 
quite worried that the decision of the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council, which favoured Ontario's claim to reserve 
lands, would include an expectation that Ontario would be 
responsible for paying out the annual monies, which were
NAC, Department of Indian Affairs Records, Black Series 
vol.8034, File 487/32-2-6 as quoted in D.J. Bourgeois report "Rat 
Portage Indian Land Claim", p.17.
J.D. Bourgeois, "Rat Portage Indian Land Claim with 
Respect to Land Identified as 'Islands' Adjacent to Rat Portage 
Indian Reserve #38B." Ministry of Natural Resources Report, July 
14, 1986, p.19.
34 Ibid.
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part of the treaty arrangements, to Native people. The 
anxiety stemmed from the fact that the province's desire for 
more territory would result in the federal government 
abdicating responsibility for Native people altogether, and 
thus, turning over the entire administrative problem of 
Indian Affairs to the provinces.
Part of the provincial concern was that at the time of 
the treaty negotiations, there was no immediate need for 
land either for settlement or for development. In Toronto's 
view, the treaty was actually twenty or thirty years 
premature in terms of real need. It may be that, in 
economic terms, the settlers would have been better off to 
make their homes where roads, markets, neighbours and 
churches already existed. And further, that even as far as 
resource development represents a purely economic motive, 
that timber, which was considered a highly desirable 
resource, would have been more valuable if it had been 
allowed to stand and mature for a longer length of time.
The province was worried that it might have taken command of 
a situation which was potentially more complex than any 
future benefit warranted. In fact, some critics of western 
expansion believed that the desire to settle the west was an 
artificially created necessity; undertaken simply because 
the federal government wanted to acquire the land as a right 
of way for the Canadian Pacific Railway."'
Ibid.
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In the interests of Ontario nothing could 
have been more irrational than the making of 
a treaty involving the payment of a large sum
of money down, and of other large sums
annually, for the surrender of the Indian 
rights to territory which the Province had 
no immediate use for or any 1 ikelihood.,of 
"settling" for half a century to come."'
In the provincial government's seal to avoid having to 
take on a custodial role with respect to the Native people, 
the fact that it was surely to everyone's benefit to have a 
fair and equitable treaty in place before the need for one 
became acute was ignored. And further, that since the sise
of the reserves allotted was in dispute, the Ontario
government could lessen its burden by disallowing the claims 
of 1040 people, which in turn would reduce the number of 
families who would have legitimate claims on the government 
to 358. It was also suggested that all reserves should be 
located on water, either the shores of lakes or on islands 
because fishing was one of the necessities of life to the 
Indians."' It is interesting to note this miserly attitude, 
and lack of real understanding of the issues involved in the 
early part of the twentieth century, because it 
characterizes the government's posture throughout.
In 1902 the Canadian government and the province of 
Ontario recognized that the Treaty 3 area should receive 
special consideration largely because both the Native people
Ibid.
Ibid.
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and the negotiators had been aware of the value of the 
resources at the time of the signing of the treaty. The 
federal government wanted all treaty Indian reserves in 
Ontario to be under the control of the government of Canada. 
In addition, the Dominion government would "hold the 
proceeds of such reserves or lands and the proceeds also of 
the timber, minerals and precious metals thereon... subject 
to the general trust...on behalf of the Indians....”"' 
Ostensibly, this meant that the federal government was to 
use the resources from the land in a responsible manner for 
the benefit of the Native peoples in that area. This gave 
considerable power to the government, through its various 
departments, to make decisions on development, bised upon 
what seemed rational and advantageous to the government as 
far the welfare of the local Indian population was 
concerned.
An example of an agreement reached between the province 
of Ontario and the federal government over control of Treaty 
3 lands was the Ontario Mining Company vs. Seybold case in 
1903. Special Reserve 38B was disallowed as a result of 
this action. Ontario had assumed control over this 
territory as early as 1882, although the land was not 
formally under the province's control until a judgement
Ontario Archives, Irving Papers, box 30, package 36,'
items 18-19,
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given by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
1BS9 .
In the interim, the federal government, believing that 
it had control of the area because it was Indian land, and 
as such fell under its jurisdiction, issued a timber license 
to the St. Catharine's Milling and Lumber Company to cut 
timber near the Wabigoon Lake district.
Neither level of government sought out the opinion of 
Native people in this dispute, even though the land in 
question was considered, at least broadly speaking, to be 
land set aside for Aboriginal people. Historian Anthony 
Hall suggested that the phrase "lands reserved for the 
Indians" under section 91(24) of the British North America 
Act was interpreted, due to a rather odd quirk of Victorian 
racism supported by a strict adherence to the principles of 
social Darwinism, to mean that the Canadian government had 
the authority to decide how these lands ought to be 
utilized.^'
This debate over land and resource use clearly revealed 
thr. federal and provincial governments' attitude toward 
Aboriginal rights to be abstract and malleable and to be 
reevaluated periodically according to the expectations or 
fancy of any government's ambition. However, Hall, who 
wrote about the St. Catharine's Milling Case, claims that
Hall,"........ " Aboriginal Resource Use In Canada:
Historical and Legal Aspects (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba 
Press, 1991), p.281.
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the federal government was more steadfast in its dealings
with Native people than was the provincial government. Ke
proposed that this case had significant implications for the
development of the Canadian constitution and that it
illustrated a fundamental difference in the perspective of
both the federal and provincial levels of government with
respect to Native people. Hall asserted that each group
acted in a predictable manner, that is, within the norms of
a particular social atmosphere, which were appropriate for
the times. He suggested, for example, that the federal
government dealt with the problem with some consideration
for Indian rights while the provincial government fell back
on the old arguments of racial superiority.
Within the dispute's own frame of reference, 
however, there were profoundly different 
approaches to fundamental questions of 
basic human rights. In advancing the 
prerogatives of centralized authority, 
officials representing the Dominion,
Victorian as they were, had indeed conducted 
themselves as vindicators of Indian rights.
On the other hand, advocates of provincial 
autonomy had based their claims on principles 
that, in light of present-day understanding, 
today appear totally abhorrent.
However, the fact must be acknowledged that this 
controversy arose because both the federal and the 
provincial governments wanted to control the timber rights 
(and subsequently other natural resources as well) within 
this territory. The very act in which each level of
Ibid
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government issued patents to cut the timber symbolized a 
political contest over land ownership which would be played 
out in the courts. For its part, the Dominion had asserted 
that the Indian claim to the land was a fundamental one, 
originating with the Proclamation of 1763 whereby Indian 
title was clearly presupposed, and the extinguishment or 
upholding of that title was given to the Crown, and 
subsequently, to the Dominion government. This fact, it was 
felt, ought to override any later claims made by the 
province of Ontario.
However, the federal government failed to demonstrate 
exactly how Native people would benefit from this special 
relationship. For example, how would the wealth gained from 
the natural resources existing on the land be utilized in 
Native communities if the federal government was successful 
in wresting control over timber rights away from the 
province. This fact indicates that the Dominion government 
did not act out of a sense of obligation to Native people, 
but rather, it acted out of a desire to control the natural 
resources. The Dominion asserted that it, not the province, 
had the right to decide how best to manage the resources 
since it had acquired the title to the lands through the 
1873 surrender by the local Native inhabitants. For 
example, the Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald said with 
respect to the Dominion government’s concerns about the 
constitutional implications of the dispute that
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The land belonged, so far back as the grant 
of Charles II could give it, to the Hudson's 
Bay Company, but it was subject to the Indian 
title. They and their ancestors had owned the 
lands for centuries until the Dominion 
Government purchased them. These lands were 
purchased, not by the province of Ontario--
it did not pay a £arthing--but by the
Dominion.... By seven treaties the Indians
of txie Northwest conveyed the lands to 
Canada; and every acre belongs now to the 
people of Canada, and not to the people of 
Ontario;... there is not one stick of timber, 
one acre of land, or one lump of lead, iron 
or gold that does not belong to the Dominion, 
or to the people who purchased from the 
Dominion government [emphasis in original].'"
Moreover, Macdonald's whole idea of subordinate 
federalism was graphically under attack by a province bent 
on, as H.V. Nelles has pointed out, "empire building."” In
supporting the Native claim to the Treaty 3 area, the Prime
Minister was doing no more than asserting the right of the 
federal government to predominance in Canada. Certainly, his 
political and constitutional fight against Premier Oliver 
Mowat of Ontario was far more important than his concern for 
Native rights.'" For its part, Ontario had argued that the 
Native people might not have had title to the lands in 
question at all, and that these lands did not belong to the 
federal government, but to the province of Ontario.
Hall, Resource U s e , p.272.
'• H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines 
and Hvdro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1949-1941 (Toronto:
McMillan of Canada, 197 4) p.5.
’ To further emphasize federal realpolitik the federal 
government relieved Natives of the franchise in 1898 after having 
extended it to Natives west of Lake Superior in 1885.
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The case was heard before Chancellor Boyd who ruled
that the province acquired full and beneficial interest in
the land, subject only to such qualified privileges of
hunting and fishing as were reserved in the treaty.’'* It is
interesting to note that throughout this case, despite the
lofty rhetoric which occurred on both sides of the debate,
that there was no direct mention of how the wealth would be
divided, nor indeed was there any mention of any other
benefits which the Native people were supposed to gain from
the sale or development of resources. Bruce Clark, a
lawyer, wrote about tht legal significance of the St.
Catharine's Milling cash and its aftermath in this way:
Tç, retrospect, the position seems to be that 
aboriginal rights as a litigious or 
justiciable issue trace to the eighteenth 
century, when Indian occupancy and domestic 
sovereignty were recognized at law. In the 
nineteenth century-this guarantee of non- 
, interference was legislatively compromised 
'las to some defined areas. The Indian Acts 
of Canada, starting in 1876, said that 
Indian Reserves, which had been specially 
set apart for particular Indian bands, were 
a special case. Indians on such Reserves no 
longer have the unfettered rights of the 
eighteenth century but rather a new set of 
more abridged and closely-regulated 
possessgry rights and band government 
powers."
There was an exhaustive discussion which took place
/ '  I ,
between F.L. Newcombe, representing the interests of the
Archives of Ontario, Land Records, A-1-7 vol.8 Inv.7 
Indian Lands, 1887-1924.
Bruce Clark, p.3.
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Dominion (and presumably Aboriginal interests as well) and
Edward Elake, who spoke for the province of Ontario as to
how the resources, and the wealth gained from those
resources ought to be apportioned. As a result of this
dialogue an agreement was placed before the Provincial
parliament on 23 April 1904. With reference to the question
of precious metals, which had been explicitly mentioned by
Native people during the treaty negotiations, Newcombe and
Blake reached a consensus, stating,
that the precious metals shall be considered 
to form part of the reserves and may be 
disposed of by the Dominion for the benefit 
of the Indians (as to Reserves under Treaty 
No. 3) proceeded upon the ground--that it was 
indisputably proved whatever the law may be 
about it, that the Indians did as part of the 
negotiation ask for and that the 
commissioners who were representing Her 
Majesty and give them, assurances 
contemporaneously with the written treaty 
that, if precious minerals were found on the 
special reserves they should belong to 
them.
The lawyer, Aemelius Irving, in commenting on the 
implications of the Newcombe-Blake negotiations, stated that 
any other questions concerning the ownership of previous 
metals must be judged according to the circumstances of each 
case, but that generally it might be assumed that anything 
which benefited Canada would benefit Canada's Indians.*'
There are, in fact, several examples of the federal
1C Irving Papers Box 40 package 38 item 16.
Ibid.
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government acting in a way that was contrary to the 
interests of Native peoples.
The federal government sold out Native interests to 
private individuals or businessmen as readily as it 
relinquished its duties to Ontario. On September 30, 1904, 
a memo was sent to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 
the Preston Bell Furniture Company in the Rainy River 
District applying for river frontage within Indian Reserve 
185 for the purpose of constructing a lumber mill and 
store." The request for land was granted by the 
commissioner despite the fact that there was no offer to 
hire Native people as workers and nor was there any clear 
benefit from the proposed mill to the Indians on whose 
property the mill was constructed. The government did not 
ask the furniture company to provide any employment 
opportunities or other tangible benefits on behalf of the 
reserve inhabitants.
In another letter from Indian Affairs' Deputy 
Superintendent General Frank Pedley to the Provincial 
Treasurer of Ontario, J.J. Matheson, dated January 13, 1905, 
a proposal was made which would lift the restrictions made 
by the 1902 agreement that allocated monies "arising from 
the sale of Treaty No.3 reserves subject to no other 
conditions except those of the Indian T r u s t . T h i s  meant
*= Ibid.
Irving Papers, Box 40, package 38, Item 16.
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that the government would be able to sell off land, as long
as it stated in a vague way that the proceeds would be used
to benefit Native people. Pedley wrote that
it is the policy of this Department to 
endeavour to obtain from the Indians a 
surrender in due form whenever it is 
considered advisable to open any Indian 
Reserve for settlement owing to pressure of 
colonization or other causes. Whenever these 
conditions and circumstances apply to 
reserves in Treaty No.3, there will be no 
evitable delay in approaching the Indians 
with a view to obtaining a legal surrender in 
order that t.he reserves may be thrown open to 
settlement.^'"'
It seems clear that uppermost in the minds of the government 
officials who were entrusted with the power to act for 
Native people was that any land that was required by the 
government for any reason ought to be acquired freely and 
promptly, without consulting the local Natives and even 
without necessarily acting on their behalf.
In 1909, Mr. Justice Davies explained the decisions 
made by the Supreme Court of Canada in the dispute between 
the Dominion of Canada and the Province of Ontario over the 
issue of who owned the resources on reserve lands." He 
acknowledged that, despite the fact that the two levels of 
government were constantly arguing over which had the proper 
authority to the actual titie of the Indian territories and 
also, who had the responsibility to ensure that the
Ibid,
CP Sessional Paper no. 50, 12 February 1909.
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agreements made in the treaty were fulfilled, treaties had
another purpose than simply allocating land. He said that
the last clause of the treaty wherein the 
Indians agree "to obey and abide by the law" 
and "to maintain peace and good order between 
each other" and also between themselves and 
other tribes and other people, and not 
"molest person or property in the ceded 
districts or interfere with any person 
passing or travelling through it," etc. from 
which I would be justified in concluding that 
the considerations of the treaty had been 
agreed to for other purpose^ than those of 
extinguishing Indian title.
Davies was clearly thinking of a larger debt which the
people of Canada owed to Native people, and saw the role of
the federal government as a responsible one, and one which
would lead, in a spirit of cooperation, to eventual
assimilation.
Mr. Justice Davies also noted that section 91(24) of 
the British North America Act (B.N.A. Act) gave the Dominion 
"exclusive power to legislate with respect to Indians and 
lands reserved for the Indians"" and that this right was 
created in order to ensure uniformity of administration. 
Davies argued that since the federal government, by virtue 
of this section of the British North America Act, was 
designated with the "high, honourable, and onerous duties of 
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who lived within the boundaries of Canada, that it ought to
be able o exercise these duties free from constraint. The
constraints which he argued against were, of course, the
limitations which the province was trying to place upon
federal power. Therefore, he believed that the federal
government should appeal the decision of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy.Council which ruled that the
province, not the Dominion, had the prior claim. Despite
such a strong ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada, the
• #
decision of the Privy Council was affirmed."
It is interesting that the courts utilized the St. 
Catharine's Milling case as if it represented a contest 
between provincial rights to acquire wealth from the land, 
and federal government protection of Indian rights.
However, it was the federal government which first gave a 
license for the cutting rights on the reserve lands, and it 
is clear that there was no stipulation that the government 
was to use the profits gained to improve or better the 
condition of the local Native people.
In 1914 the federal government and the provinces came 
upon a scheme which effectively eroded treaty rights even 
further. By utilizing section 91 of the British North 
America Act the government established policies based upon 
two distinct and opposing premises. The first dealt with 
the role of the provincial government which was defined as
" Ibid. ■
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that of a "bare trustee"^' and as such it is clear that the 
province cannot sell Native lands, nor can it derive benefit 
from them. The second proposition gave the surrendered 
lands to the province of Ontario, recognizing that while 
Native people have the right to pursue their hunting and 
fishing activities on these Crown lands, they were subject 
to any such regulations as might come into effect and 
further, that some of these lands might be taken up for 
other development by either the government of the Dominion 
of Canada or by some authority named by the government.'^ 
These agreements between the federal and provincial 
governments did not encourage a fair and equitable 
consideration for Native peoples, but rather, it seems clear 
that Native interests were sacrificed for political and 
economic interests.
British North America Act, section 91
Provincial Archives of 0 
8. Inv.7 Indian Lands 1887-1924
Ontario, Land Records A-I-7 vol
V/
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chapter Three 
THE FORT FRANCES CASE
The federal government's poor record regarding its 
responsibilities with respect to Native rights is 
clearly evidenced in the case of the Ontario and 
Minnesota Power Company's activities in the Rainy River 
district. The government's lack of concern over some 
reserve land which was flooded by this company is 
really indicative of its attitude in general. It is 
clear that, from the signing of Treaty 3 in 1873 
through to the first thirty years of the twentieth 
century, the government attitude had been that the 
profit and development interests of business and the 
independence and assimilation interests of the 
governments' Indian policies meshed in a manner which 
was disastrous for Native people.
In Fort Frances, Ontario there is a good example 
of how Aboriginal rights, guaranteed under Treaty 3, 
were subordinated to the interests of Edward Backus, a 
wealthy American industrialist who dreamed of 
controlling all of the resources in the Rainy Lake
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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district. The municipal government of Fort Frances, 
the province of Ontario, and the federal government of 
Canada aided Backus in achieving this dream even if it 
meant that the latter bungled its responsibility toward 
Native people of the Rainy River region by allowing the 
Backus company to flood traditional Indian land.
Background 1905-7
On August 11, 1905 the federal Minister of Public Works
received an application by Edward Backus requesting
permission to build a power dam on the Rainy River at
Fort Frances. The town is on the Canada-United States
border and the dam would span the river to a point on
the American side. E.W. Backus had made an agreement
with the province of Ontario for land and power grants
on the Canadian side because the government was also
interested in developing water power facilities to
foster the growth of mills and other manufacturing
plants. The value of the grants described totalled
$5,000" There were several conditions demanded of the
Backus company by the government of Ontario before an
agreement was struck. For example,
the raising and maintaining of the waters of 
Rainy Lake; [the Rainy River flows into the 
Rainy Lake] the use or non-use of flash- 
boards; the construction of power-houses;
' Department of Indian Affairs, Black Series, volu.'̂ i- '.•'.21, 
file 232,7 99. /, 'v.
/
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the expenditure of $50,000.00 on the works 
within nine months from the date of the 
agreement; the delivery of power to the Town 
of Fort Frances after the 1st January 1907, 
for municipal purposes and for public 
utilities the operation and delivery of said 
power; the rate at which it shall be 
furnished; the intervention of the 
Lieutenant Governor in Council concerning 
the price of̂  the power or energy to be 
created...,"
As well. Fort Frances had an interest in the project 
and worked with Backus to ensure that the dam was 
built. The company asked the town directly to refrain 
from making any inquiries which might hold up the 
application at any level and, not surprisingly, the 
town agreed."
The application was accepted by the government and 
the Chief Engineer of the Department of Public Works 
reported that the dam would not interfere with 
navigation. Instead, because of the flooding of the 
rapids two miles above the falls, navigation would 
actually be improved.'* The only possible objection 
which the engineer noted was taken care of in "a clause 
in the Act of Incorporation of the Company which makes
" Ibid.
Archives of Ontario, unprocessed records RG 22, Rainy 
River High Court of Justice civil assize minutes 1910-1949.
" NAC Department of Indian Affairs Records, Black Series, 
Volume 4021, file 28759.
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all damages to lands caused by their works a charge to 
be borne by them.""'
The application went through the "proper" 
channels, from the Department of Public Works, to the 
Department of Justice. The Justice Department replied 
that they had to consider how the dam would affect 
navigation and the fishery. After considering its 
report of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, the 
request was accepted, and the plans next went to the 
Governor in Council. The application was finally 
approved, subject to some conditions.
The Ontario and Minnesota Power Company had a map 
prepared in 1902 designed to show the extent of the 
flooding which would likely occur as a result of the 
dam." This is important because it illustrated that 
the government had access to information which would 
predict how extensive the flooding would be after the 
dam was constructed. Even with all the levels of 
government involved, with all the departments and 
offices which examined the application and made further 
recommendations to the proposal, no one considered the 
impact the proposed flooding of reserve land might have 
on the Native people who occupied that land. The only
" Ibid.
" NAC, Department of Indian Affairs Records, Black Series, 
Volume 4021, file 282,759.
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worry at the time the dam was constructed, as far as
the Department of Indian Affairs was concerned, was
that the Indian Agent's home, located on Pithers Point,
would have to be relocated elsewhere.*’ In a letter in
late December 1905 to J.D. McLean, Assistant Deputy
Superintendent General of the Department of Indian
Affairs, E.W. Backus reported that,
our dam will raise the water up to the 
foundation of the agent's house on Pithers
Point, but it will not overflow the spot
where the house now sits. At the same time 
it would probably not be agreeable to the 
agent's residence at that point, and 
therefore would like very much to have you 
plan to occupy one of the other locations, 
and I desire to have you advise me of how 
much th% expense would be in making the 
change."
Only later, after the political and bureaucratic
machinery had rendered its decision, was there any
thought given to the consequences of the flooding for
the Native people. In a letter dated March 7, 1906
from J.D. McLean to E.L. Newcombe, Deputy Minister of
Justice, there was some acknowledgement made that
flooding would indeed occur on reserve lands.
The Ontario and Minnesota Power Company, 
Ltd., claims that, under the authority 
granted the Company by 'an Act respecting 
the Ontario and Minnesota Power Company, 
Ltd., Chap.139-4-5-Edward VII. assented to
NAC Department of Indian Affairs Records, Black Series, 
Volume 4021, file 282,759.
Ibid. Letter from E.W. Backus to Department of Indian 
Affairs December, 1905.




20th July, 1905,’ the said Company has the 
right to raise the water of the St. Frances 
River [Rainy River] and if in doing this an 
Indian reserve or any portion thereof is 
flooded the Department of Indian Affairs may 
proceed, under section 35 of the Indian Act, 
to collect damages for the injury sustained. 
The Company is perfectly willing to pay such 
reasonable damages."
McLean assured the deputy minister that this 
acknowledgement made by the Company applied to the 
"reserve in question within the meaning of the Act, 
and asked for guidance from the Justice Department. 
McLean suggested that perhaps the "surrender from the 
Indians [of this tract] should be dispensed with."" In 
a letter of March 12, Newcombe replied that there was 
little chance of restitution because section 35 stated 
that compensation may be "made to the Indians in the 
'same manner as is provided with respect to the lands 
or rights of other persons' and there was no provision 
in the Act Chapter 139 of 1905 [the Act granting the 
Ontario and Minnesota Power Company the right to build 
the dam] for the payment of compensation."*'” Newcombe
* Ibid. Memorandum DÎA to Deputy Minister of Justice, March
*' Ibid. 
" Ibid.
Ibid. Memorandum Minister of Justice to DIA, March 1906
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suggested, however, that some reimbursement might be
agreed to by arbitration outside of the statute.'*
On March 14, 1906 a memo was sent from the Chief
Surveyor to McLean asking for an authorization from the
Department of Indian Affairs
to sell, lease or otherwise grant the right,
to flood the land in the general Indian
reserve No.l, near Fort Frances Ont., that 
may be recvired in connection with the 
construction of the dam by the Ontario and 
Minnesota Power Company, (the area, of the 
said land being approximately eighteen 
acres}, on such terms as may be decided ; 
upon.'*
McLean, in turn, requested the Governor General in 
Council to grant (not lease or sell) the right to flood 
the land since the dam would result in the flooding of
about eighteen acres as well as causing some damage to
property belonging to the Department of Indian Affairs. 
McLean also noted that the Company had expressed a-, 
willingness to pay for the damage."
In April, 1906 the Indian Agent at Fort Frances, 
J.P. Wright warned the Department of Indian Affairs to 
"consider the whole matter very carefully" because the 
flooding would also damage the road which was on the 
reserve which followed the lake shore. He wanted to
Ibid.
* NAC Department of Indian Affairs, Black Series, Volume 
4021, file 282,759-1. Memorandum from Chief Surveyor to DIA, 
March 190 6.
Ibid. DIA memorandum April, 1906.
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make sure that any compensation made to the department 
for damages would cover the building of the road.
Wright also wrote to McLean, advising him that the 
government jught to request payment of $1000 per acre 
from the Ontario and Minnesota Power Company, because 
it was believed that the company wanted to secure the 
land for speculation. McLean wrote, that "the whole 
[Pithers] Point is an ideal place for a summer 
resort.”" Curiously, while neither the Indian agent, 
nor the federal government seemed overly concerned that 
the proposed flooding would damage reserve land, Indian 
Agent Wright, in any case, was sufficiently worried 
about his own personal garden, consisting of 
"raspberry, gooseberry and currant bushes" to request 
separate compensation of $150 to be paid directly to 
him.
Not surprisingly, lawyers for the Ontario and 
Minnesota Power Company informed the government that 
the value placed on the land was excessive and 
subsequently asked that a disinterested party be named 
to set the value of the land in question. The 
department instructed S. Bray, a surveyor with the 
government, to examine the situation. In a memorandum
* Department of Indian Affairs Records, Black Series, 
Volume 4021, file 282 759-1. Letter from Indian Agent Wright in 
Fort Frances to DIA, April 1906.
Ibid.
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dated November 1907 the surveyor suggested that the
value of the land was $1472 rationalizing that
Pithers Point is especially adapted 
for the purposes of a summer resort 
as it is situated on the Lake shore 
where there is a long sand beach which 
happens to be the only one within easy 
reach of Fort Frances. Lots in Fort 
Frances and in the two townplots on the 
opposite side of the river in the United 
States are being held at hight prices.
Sales are being made on the United 
States side and ready sales were made in 
Fort Frances two or three months ago.
The government was clearly engaging in some land 
speculation as well; they did not quote the current 
value of the land in question, but rather, were looking 
forward to the flooding with an eye to increasing the 
value of the land, and consequently were hoping to 
charge the company on the future worth of the land.
In this memorandum, Bray also cautioned the
government that the flooding would do far more damage
than initially believed.
On account of the land being very flat 
more land will be damaged on account 
of its being nearly level with the water 
than that actually submerged... the damage 
will be very great. I think any proposition 
to raise the water above the [previously 
agreed upon] 497 Bench Mark should be,, 
opposed decidedly by this Department.'*
Ibid. Memorandum from government surveyor S. Bray to DIA, 
November, 1907.
Ibid
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Bray noted, for example, that the foundations of the 
school located on the reserve would be in danger 
because the dam would create marsh-like conditions over 
much of the reserve. Bray was also concerned that much 
of the damage caused by the flooding would not be 
evident until the dam was built. Acting on this 
""knowledge, McLean, on behalf of the Department of 
Indian Affairs, suggested that the company would be 
liable for any other damage at the rate of $50 per 
acre.
There is strong evidence then, that the federal 
government did not fully acknowledge its responsibility 
toward Native people regarding the trusteeship of the 
reserve lands. There were no declarations recorded 
from either the Indian agent in Fort Frances, or the 
department, that the proposed flooding would destroy 
reserve territory as such. There was no evidence to 
suggest that the government had any concerns whatsoever 
that the proposed flooding would have any impact on 
Native people. It seems strange that the government 
was only concerned with the dollar value of potential 
resort land, while being indifferent to the possible 
repercussions of the flooding on Native people because 
the department's mandate was clearly not to act as a 
realtor, but to protect Aboriginal peoples interests. 
The government neglected its primary obligation.
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After Construction 1909-13
Predictably, after the construction of the dam, 
there were considerably more problems associated with 
the flooding than anticipated. It appeared that the 
worst fears of the federal government were realized; 
damage to reserve land was extensive, and the 
government lacked the strength to compel the Backus 
company to make reparations.
Rather like closing the barn door after the horse 
has run off, Indian agent Wright complained to the 
Department in December 1909 that the high water in 
Rainy Lake, caused by the dam was endangering an Indian 
burial plot on the reserve.^' The Department of Indian 
Affairs, in turn, notified the lawyers for the Ontario 
and Minnesota Power Company, and requested that some 
preventative measures be undertaken to deflect further 
damage. This request launched a long and fruitless 
struggle between the government and the company over 
the damaged reserve lands. The Department of Indian 
Affairs threatened legal action, arranged for surveys 
of the damaged lands, suggested ways to correct various 
problems of erosion and demanded reparation. For its 
part, the Backus company ignored, denied, promised and 
executed partial and unsatisfactory repairs.
Ibid. Memorandum from Indian Agent Wright to DIA, 
December, 190 9.
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Following the initial complaints from Wright on
behalf of the residents of the reserve, the lawyers for
the Ontario and Minnesota Power Company wrote to the
Department of Indian Affairs that the high water levels
were not as severe as originally reported and that the
company had taken it upon itself to drain off large
amounts of water from the area so that there was no
need for further concern. According to Wright, there
was no such draining and, in fact, the water level was
at its highest point ever. Wright warned the
department that if nothing was done
before another year...a portion of the 
graves [would be] washed into the lake 
and we would have the town of Fort Frances 
after us with a bill of damages foj; 
polluting the water of Rainy Lake.
The department hired an engineer from Fort 
William, G.A. Knowlton, to study the problem and to 
suggest a suitable remedy. In March 1910 a report was 
made which recommended several measures, including the 
construction of a breakwater to protect the shoreline 
and the planting of shrubbery to prevent further 
erosion. The engineer's report noted that "unless 
something is done before next summer, the water will 
encroach on the cemetery, and some of the Indian houses
Ibid. Memorandum Indian Agent Wright to DIA, December,
1909.
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will have to be removed."'' The estimate for these 
improvements was given as $9000 which included the cost 
of the survey.
Backus replied to the government’s plan in April
of that year; he maintained that the water level had
not yet risen to overflow Pithers Point, but he assured
the government that he would be raising it even more in
the near future. It is clear that Backus was not going
to admit that any repair would be necessary, much less
agree to the government’s proposal for how the
renovations ought to be carried out. While Wright
continued to press the department for some kind of
definite action to protect reserve lands and buildings,
the government was trying to force Backus to do
something. McLean wrote
I have to ask you [Backus] to take 
immediate steps as indicated in the 
said letter to your Attorneys to 
protect the banks of the lake now 
being washed away. I have to request 
you to be good enough to send an 
immediate reply and to say that in the 
event of your not taking immediate action 
in this matter the Department will be 
obliged to undertake the work of protecting 
the banks ?.i:d the said work will be done 
at the expense of your Company.*
Backus replied to the government through his 
lawyers that the $9000 estimated was too large an
Ibid. Engineer's Report submitted to DIA, March, 1910. 
Ibid. Letter from J.D. McLean to E.W. Backus, April 1910
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amount to spend "in this connection" and proposed 
ratlier that the company undertake to remove the bodies 
from the cemetery, if the Indians would agree to such a 
compro.i'iise. The department responded by June 1910 with 
the fact that the residents would not agree to move 
their dead, and further, that it had been discovered 
that the school building was now in danger as well.
Although the Backus company sent out one of their 
engineers with a construction crew early in July,
Wright reported in October 1910 that no actual work had 
been done on the site as of that date. Wright was 
obviously frustrated that nothing was being done, and 
that he could not find out what work, if any, was 
intended. Also, Wright acknowledged that the water 
level had receded somewhat and informed the department 
that the work ought to be progressing now, when it 
could be done cheaply and effectively.** Again, the 
department tried to get some commitment from Backus, 
but he was able to defer comment in November by stating 
that the best time to do the necessary construction 
would be in the winter. In fact, correspondence from 
Wright as late as March 1911 indicates that no 
corrective work had been done at all.
*̂ Ibid. Report from Indian Agent Wright to DIA, October,
1910.
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All interested parties were trying to exert 
pressure on the Ontario and Minnesota Power Company, 
but to no avail. In March 1911, the chief of the 
Couchiching Band at Fort Frances wrote a letter to 
Frank Pedley reminding the minister that they had 
pr oi!i.i s':m; that something be done and yet, "the bank of 
our Lake...is falling in day by day .
It is clear that the government was not pressing
Backus hard enough to achieve a positive effect. In an
April 1911 letter to Wright, McLean revealed just how
weak the government felt in this matter. Even though
Backus had denied, lied and stalled over this incident
for over two years McLean said that
there appears however to be some intention 
to endeavour to have necessary work done.
I may say the Department would prefer 
not to take any action until practically 
compelled to do so.**
One has to wonder exactly what it would take to 
"compel" the department to take some action on behalf 
of Aboriginal people. Property had been destroyed, 
burial grounds were damaged and continued to be in 
danger, and the original agreement between the company 
and the department recognized and allowed that there 
might be some further liability for damages which might
*■ Ibid. Letter from chief of Couchiching Band at Port 
Frances to Frank Pedley, March, 1911.
>3 Ibid. Letter DIA to Indian Agent Wright, April 1911,
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have occurred after the building of the dam and that 
such liability rested with the company. Yet, for 
whatever reasons, the department was hesitant either to 
compel the company to do the work, or to undertake the 
work themselves, and take the company to court for 
costs at a later date.
Only in January 1913 did the Department of Indian
Affairs ask the advice of the Minister of Justice as
to how it might proceed with this case. The deputy
minister of justice wrote that
the Company had no right to erect a dam 
which would cause the waters to flow back 
upon the reserve. I think therefore that 
unless the Company agrees to satisfactory 
terms and obtain the necessary permission 
to flood these lands they may be enjoined 
from maintaining the dam, and are further 
liable for any damages consequent upon 
the flooding. I think the Company should 
be notified accordingly, and if they do 
not come to terms, proceedings should be 
taken in the Exchequer court.
In February, Wright reported to the department 
that some work had finally been done to protect the 
bank and the school from the encroaching waters; 
however, the work "is not of a permanent nature and is 
of no use as it will all wash away in the spring."
This message was subsequently passed on to the company
” Ibid. Memorandum from DIA to Minister of Justice, 
January, 1913.
Ibid. Memorandum Indian Agent Wright to DIA, February
1913.
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through the department, along with the threat of legal 
action if "substantial and satisfactory works" were not 
immediately undertaken. Although it appeared that 
McLean had taken a strong position with regard to the 
damages done, this was not the case.
The Inspector of Indian Agencies, John Simmons, 
submitted a standard report on the condition of the 
reserve to the federal government in the spring of 1913 
and noted many of the concerns expressed by members of 
the flooded reserve. After careful investigation, the 
extent of the damages caused by the flooding were 
1isted:
1. The length of the land affected is nearly 
a mile. The depth of the loss is from 25 
to 54 feet.
2. There are many cracks in the soil at the 
top of the bank, which will go over 
shortly.
1, The bridges, which are all rebuilt last 
summer...will have to be moved back....
4. Five houses have already have already 
been moved back.,..
5. Some curbing was done by the Indians 
years ago to guard the grave yard. This 
consisted of poles driven into the 
ground horizontal logs behind the posts 
and stone thrown in behind the logs and 
this is standing fairly well.
6. A curb was built last Summer some 1200 
ft.long. This consisted of two inch 
planks 8 ft. long sunk in the ground 2 
ft...the motion of the waves has 
completely prostrated it and it is now 
lying flat on the ground and is 
absolutely useless.
7. The boarding school...has been damaged.
8. The hay grounds of the Indians have been
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entirely submerged and they are now 
compelled to buy all their hay. °
Simmons' report also stressed the necessity that "'some
real work" must be done in order to prevent further,
more serious erosion damage.
In the fall of 1913 a report was sent to the 
Department of Indian Affairs from Chief Surveyor S.
Bray outlining certain recommendations which had been 
suggested following an examination of the damaged lands 
by Bray himself, two senior executives of the Ontario 
and Minnesota Power Company, John J. Poss and T.D. 
McAnulty, and Indian Agent J.P. Wright. The report 
noted that the cost of effectively protecting the 
reserve lands from flood damage would be $25,000. and 
that this was "an unreasonable sum to spend for this 
purpose."*' Alternatively, this group suggested that 
the lakefront property, consisting of some sixty acres, 
be subdivided into lots and sold with the understanding 
that the owner of the individual lot would be 
responsible for protecting the shoreline and would 
subsequently have "no redress for damage done by the
NAC, Department of Indian Affairs Records, Black Series 
Volume 4021, file 282 759-1.
Ibid. Report from government surveyor S. Bray to DIA, 
October, 1913.
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water either against the Department or against the 
Minnesota and Ontario Power Company.'**
Not surprisingly, this plan for selling off the 
damaged reserve lands met with strong opposition within 
the Native community. Rev. Father Vales, principal of 
the reserve school and spokesman for band members, was 
against selling the lands and tried to impress upon the 
delegation the importance of keeping the school 
property separate from the town lands. Vales also 
suggested that many local Native people could be 
employed in the construction of the breakwater. Bray 
noted that he did not discuss the matter further with 
Vales because he did not think that Vales’ objection 
was valid and because he thought it was important the 
departme:-'i;be "relieved by the proposed sale of the 
lots of any responsibility in regard to the washing 
awav of the land."** The Department of Indian Affairs 
agreed wholeheartedly with Bray's report and it was 
decided that only the flooded lands which endangered 
the school would be protected with a breakwater.
As a result of these investigations, the 
Department decided to undertake the necessary repairs 
themselves, and by January 1914 the government had a
** Ibid.
** Ibid. Report from government surveyor S. Bray to DIA, 
October, 1913.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 5
plan for propping up the water front. A breakwater 
was subsequently constructed, and, although the cost of 
$6000 was originally borne by the government, it was 
done with the understanding that all costs would be 
recovered from the Ontario and Minnesota Power Company 
at a later date. In addition, it was not clear who did 
the work on the breakwater; in any event there was no 
mention that Fr. Vales' suggestion that local Native 
people be employed to work on the breakwater was ever 
seriously considered.
Even though the total sum for the construction of 
the breakwater was much reduced because the government 
insisted that only those lands which put the school 
building in danger be protected, the Backus company 
continued to object to such an expenditure. The 
government was compelled, once again, to try to force 
Backus to meet his obligations. However, it took years 
of alternatively pleading and threatening 
correspondence before even partial remuneration was 
recovered.
By July 1914, all work on the breakwater was 
completed, and even though a bill outlining the costs 
was submitted to the Ontario and Minnesota Power 
Company, Backus' lawyers wrote to the department 
complaining that financial strain made payment 
impossible and begged for some additional time to repay
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the debt.** The company, it appeared, had little real 
desire to fulfil its obligations to the government and 
although it offered to make a payment of $1000 in 
October, the government did not receive any money until 
April of 1915, and that minimal amount only after much 
threatening of legal action.
According to correspondence from Wright to the 
department in April 1916, some of the residents of the 
reserve were protesting that the breakwater was not 
protecting their homes. Wright reminded the government 
that the surveyor, S. Bray, had recommended in his 
report that the houses would have to be moved back from 
the shoreline, and had even allowed $700 in the budget 
to carry this out, but this had not been done." In 
July Bray made another visit to the reserve and noted 
that more damage had been caused from the high water 
levels on Rainy Lake. The department informed the 
Ontario and Minnesota Power Company of these damages. 
However, the company attributed the high water level to 
heavy rainfall rather than to the effects of the dam.*^
The question of water levels on the Lake of the
Ibid. Letter from legal representatives of E.W. Backus to 
DIA, October, 1914.
Ibid. Memorandum Indian Agent Wright to DIA, April, 1916.
NAC, Department of Indian Affairs Records, Black Series, 
Volume 4021, file 282 759-1. Letter from representatives of E.W. 
Backus to DIA, August, 1916.
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Woods was addressed by the International Joint 
Commission in 1917 which reported that a series of 
dams, constructed between 1879-1909 with the approval 
of both Canada and the United States for a variety of 
purposes, artificially raised the water level 
throughout the region. Generally, the report stated 
that the dams ought to maintain the water at ordinary 
summer levels, that is, about 3.5 feet above natural 
conditions. As well, to facilitate navigation, the 
report cautioned against allowing the water level to 
fall below a certain point.** The commission 
acknowledged many complaints from people who suffered 
losses by the high water levels, and noted that 
liability for such damages caused by the flooding 
varied according to the individual contracts made with 
the province or state agencies.
This report of the Joint Commission generated 
interest among non-Native residents, and may in fact 
have encouraged people to seek some sort of redress for 
damaged property. Since the government was trying to 
force the Ontario and Minnesota Power Company to pay to 
protect further property damage, and the case was 
likely to go to court, it seemed natural that the town 
of Fort Frances would seek some form of restitution as
’* Final Report of the International Joint Commission on the 
Lake of the Woods Reference Ottawa-Washinqton, (Washington: 
Washington Government Printing Office, 1917 pp. 16-17.
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well. The town solicitor, A. Hurray wrote to the 
Department of Indian Affairs informing them of the 
town's desire to join in any legal action which the 
department might bring against Backus. Murray wrote 
that
a large area of the land in question is 
now under water and a considerable portion 
is converted into a swamp, resulting in the 
destruction of a magnificent grove of oak 
trees...[for which we] are entitled to 
compensation...[and] the damages sustained 
by the Town are quite serious. The most 
attractive part of the park being rendered 
absolutely unfit to be used fpr the purposes 
for which the Town leased it.^
Murray also asserted that the Ontario and Minnesota
Power Company had been authorized to raise the level of
Rainy Lake to 495 B.M., but that in fact it was raised
to 497 B.M. The disagreement over what was an
acceptable water level originated after the dam was
built, even though the plans submitted by the Backus
company and approved by the government clearly
indicated that the water level was to be set at 497
B.M.** It may be that the government and town
officials, encouraged by the fact that legal action was
imminent, decided to put forth as strong a case as they
could, hoping to win significant compensation.
** NAC Department of Indian Affairs Records, Black Series, 
Volume 4021, file 282 759-2.
Ibid. Blueprints of proposed dam, including high water 
bench marks submitted by E.W. Backus to DIA, August 11, 1905.
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In December 1917 Bray sent a memorandum to the 
Department of Indian Affairs, acknowledging that the 
Ontario and Minnesota Power Company had finally paid 
the full $5000 owing the department for work carried 
out on the breakwater in 1914. In addition, however, 
Bray included an estimate for further claims upon the 
company. He cited an amount, $15,425 as costs for the 
flooding of thirteen acres of land and damage to 
buildings on Pithers Point and another $2,950 for 
damages suffered by the residents on the reserve.
Legal Struggles 1917-20
In 1917, there occurred what appears to have been 
an independent suit brought to court by the members of 
the reserve whose land was flooded. Individual members 
attempted to take the Ontario and Minnesota Power 
Company to court to force the company to reimburse them 
for damages done. The Supreme Court of Ontario heard 
the case on June 20th, 1917. C.R. Fitch, a Fort Frances 
lawyer, was the solicitor representing the Native side, 
while Mr. Justice Kelly presided over the case.^
Evidence was submitted to the court on behalf of 
the plaintiff, including numerous photographs of the
Archives of Ontario, RG 22 unprocessed records, Rainy 
River High Court of Justice, civil assize minutes 1910-1949. The 
Native people named in the action were Matthew H, Smith, Seth S. 
Smith, Narcisse Gagne, Henry Durant, Christian Holbeck, A.E. Dear 
and Alfred Bishop.
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area after the flooding, for example, pictures of the 
packing house, the ice house and other buildings, and 
pictures of private homes which had been destroyed. As 
well, photographs were submitted which showed the 
fishery at the 1915 level and pictures of people 
standing at both high and low water marks.*' This 
evidence was submitted to illustrate the extent of the 
damage incurred by the Native community.
There were also items exhibited in support of the 
Ontario and Minnesota Power Company. These included 
several photographs illustrating log jams, presumably 
to illustrate the necessity of raising the water levels 
to transport logs on the waterways, and the blueprint 
of the final plans of the dam. Also submitted was a 
copy of the Act, Chapter 139-4-5 Edward VII, giving the 
company the right to build the dam and flood the 
territory as well as a copy of the agreement between 
E.W. Backus and the province of Ontario, the Order-in- 
Council dated January 13, 1905, and the Order-in- 
Council approving the plans in September 13, 1905, and 
the Order in Council of January 27, 1909.
There was a notation made on June 28th directing 
Charles Fowler, the Minneapolis attorney representing 
the Ontario and Minnesota Power Company, to gather more 
evidence and return within thirty days. On September
Ibid.
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5, 1917 the case was again before the court, this time 
with new blueprints which illustrated the contuui of 
the dam and the contour of the river at the dam.
There were more postponements, with no new
evidence submitted until December 12, 1917. And on 
that day there was no definite date set to return to 
the courts. It is interesting that in the book of 
Judgements one of the plaintiffs, Henry Durant, was 
awarded $1,400 on August 1, 1917’* which would mean 
that he received an award before the case was 
reconvened. In any case, there was no further mention 
of the case proceeding to some conclusive settlement. 
Perhaps it was a foregone conclusion that Native peopli 
could not act independently of the Department of Indian 
Affairs, which had a policy of interfering in, but not 
necessarily improving the lot of Aboriginal people. As
far as the courts were concerned the matter was left in
limbo, and Fitch himself was unable to collect any 
money for his services until 1925.’’
The opinion of the Justice Department was sought 
in May 19.9 by the Department of Indian Affairs because 
a good portion of the government's case rested on the 
fact that an Order-in-Counci1 did not actually approve
’* RG 22, unprocessed records. Judgement Book for the High 
Court of Justice Rainy River District 1909-1948.
On December 5, 1926 a case was heard in Port Arthur in 
which C.R. Fitch Recovered costs of $1,514.
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the original pl^ns for the dam, which included the 
notation that the water level would be allowed to rise 
above the 495 B.M. to 497 B.M. There was also some 
dispute as to whether or not the town of Fort Frances 
could be included in a suit brought before the 
Exchequer Court.
Lawyers working of behalf of the government sought 
to find information to support all possible claims. 
Although the Department of Indian Affairs knew that 
there was more damage to some of the homes on the 
northern part of the reserve the impetus to ensure that 
these people were properly compensated did not come 
from them, but rather from the lawyers.***
It is interesting to note that compensation 
interests were not valued equally and consequently 
there was an enormous difference in the size of the 
claims made by some of the prominent citizens in Fort 
Frances compared with the claims made on behalf of 
Native people. Even though non-Native residents were 
less likely to own a great deal of property, it seems 
odd that such vast damages as those reported by white 
residents were not generally known prior to the 
lawyers' investigation in 1918. The average claim for 
any of the reserve residents was about $200, with some
*** NAC, Department of Indian Affairs Records, Black Series, 
Volume 4021, file 282759-2,
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claims as low as $25 and one as high as $915. The 
LuLal acreage of reserve land which was lost because of 
the flooding was valued by the department at $17,975.
On the other hand, the average claim for non-Katives 
was $15,000 and no claims were lower than $13,000.
Some of the elements which were considered in the 
assessment of non-Native claims included such 
intangibles as the depreciation of the scenic value of 
the property. The total amount of property damage 
claimed was in excess of $85,000 and less than $4000 of 
that figure represented compensation to Native people, 
yet, almost all of the damaged lands were, at least, 
technically, Aboriginal lands.*** It seems clear that 
for whatever reason, non-Native residents of the town 
were able to claim a disproportionate amount of 
property damage compared to what Native people did and 
that the government did not press as hard as it might 
have for compensation. For example, there was no 
mention that Native people should be reimbursed for the 
loss of their labour due to damaged crops or fences, 
nor was there any mention that they ought to be 
compensated because they suffered any loss and 
enjoyment from a splendid view made unsightly by flood 
damage.
Ibid. Reports made from legal representatives to DIA,
1913.
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From all available evidence it would appear that 
the court case itself was inconclusive, and that 
proceedings were stalled and overwhelmed by 
bureaucratic red tape. For example, a letter to the 
deputy minister of Justice in April 1919, from the 
Toronto law firm involved in the case, stated that in 
order to continue investigations an order-in-council- 
deal ing with the construction of the dam would need to 
be revoked cr annulled because it was based on a mis­
statement of fact.*** The deputy niinister of Justice 
replied to this difficulty by suggesting that any 
information dealing with the original agreement and 
subsequent order-in-counci 1 would be held by the 
Department of Public Works.'** It was also noted that 
in order for the government to make a case against the 
Ontario and Minnesota Power Company it would have to be 
proved that the restoration work was done was 
unauthorized. A further difficulty, as viewed by the 
Justice Department, involved establishing the value of 
the damaged reserve lands.
Although a court date was set for September 14, 
1920, it was immediately adjourned until October. At 
that time a monetary settlement for damaged land was
*** NAC Department of Indian Affairs Records Black Series 
Volume 4021, file 282 159-2. Letter from legal representatives to 
minister of Justice, April, 1919.
Ibid.
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set at $17,957. In a letter describing the proceedings 
forwarded to McLean, it was noted that there was some 
disagreement over whether the Department of Indian 
Affairs could claim any damage to lands which flowed 
around the shoreline. If this claim was going to be 
disallowed there would be little sense of pursuing the 
case because almost all of the damaged land was within 
this disputed area.**’ It was decided to move the 
proceeding to Ottawa to explore the merits of the case 
further.
In Ottawa, the court was made aware of the fact 
that a strip of land was to be set aside between the 
water and the beginning of the reserve lands two 
chains, or approximately one hundred and thirty feet in 
width for road allowance, wharves or for other public 
uses.'** A decision was subsequently made which stated 
that the reserve lands did nit extend to the water's 
edge and that the reserve was, technically speaking, 
not damaged. While applying strict legal definitions 
as to where the reserve lands began it is clear that 
the court ignored the practical usage of that chain 
allowance. There was a case to be made of the fact 
that on the Port Frances reserve there had never been
**’ NAC Department of Indian Affairs Records, Black Series, 
Volume 4021, file 232 759-2.
Ibid. Documents from court proceedings, October, 1920.
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any plans for the public use of that chain allowance
and that the land, realistically, was regarded as part
of the reserve. However, this option was never fully
developed nor was it adequately pursued through the
courts. Further, the lawyers who were ostensibly
representing Native interests through the Department of
Indian Affairs refused to bring in Native people as
witnesses, thus denying any impact their testimony of
the personal loss might have brought to bear on the
case. The lawyers stated that the
Indians with one exception [were] not being 
called, as the other side gave no evidence 
in reply on this phase of the case. He 
accordingly did not put in the Indians as 
they could have been very unsatisfactory and 
possibly dangerous witnesses.'*
This refusal to bring in the human element seems
strange at best and negligent at worse. The fact that
the "other side" chose not to speak to the damage
suffered by individuals because of the flooding seems a
poor reason for the lawyers whose job was to represent
the interests of Native people not to bring this aspect
of the case into the forefront of the discussion. The
fact that this indifference did occur, and that the
government, through its legal representatives, failed
to protect Native rights adequately in this particular
Ibid. Documents from court proceediiigr.^. Letter from legal 
representatives to Toronto firm, October, 1919.
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example may be symptomatic of the general lack of real 
concern for Native people.
There were no subsequent appeals made on behalf of 
Native people, even though the lawyers representing the 
government had stated that they were in a good position 
to get some costs for damages against the Ontario and 
Minnesota Power Company. It seems that the Department 
of Indian Affairs either lost interest in pursuing any 
case based on personal property damage alone, or it 
felt uncertain about attempting an additional suit once 
the court established the fact that the shoreline was 
not technically part of the reserve. In effect, the 
case was not resolved at all; rather, it was left to 
lie in indecision.
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CONCLUSION
It would appear that the Department of Indian 
Affairs was more interested in the future value of tl 
reserve land as real estate than in protecting treaty 
rights. Even though there was some limited procedure 
in place in the original contract with the Ontario and 
Minnesota Power Company through which the government 
could have insisted that restitution be made for damage 
resulting from the flooding, the government was not 
able to obtain adequate compensation. This failure on 
the part of the government to seek a satisfactory 
settlement may be attributed to racist ideas.
Certainly, there was no doubt that the white people in 
Fort Frances were successful in justifying their 
losses, even to the point that, when their magnificent 
panorama was destroyed, they were compensated for their 
lost "view." The lack of justice in this case is 
truly astounding. The government refused to address 
the issue either by bringing the full force of the law 
to bear when considering the flood damaged property in
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legal terms, or by protecting Native people as people
who suffered personal loss due to the flooding. While
this posture of indifference may partially be
attributed to the nature of bureaucracy and the
dehumanization of institutions, one must also
acknowledge the racism prevalent in the government’s
dealings with Native people throughout history. This
excerpt from an Ontario Bar Association publication
written for law students provides a fair assessment of
the variety of predicaments which Native people faced
in their dealings with the government of Canada. ,
Many of the promises made in the treaties 
have not been kept over the years or were 
never initially fulfilled. Hunting and 
fishing rights have been overridden by 
general federal legislation in the form 
of the Migratory Birds Convention Act and 
the Fisheries A c t . The purchase price that 
was originally paid under these agreements 
was frequently exceedingly below the fair 
market value and might be regarded as so 
inadequate as to be unconscionable 
consideration,
In addition, Indian reserve lands have 
sometimes been expropriated without adequate 
or any compensation, been illegally sold, 
been lost through moving boundaries or by 
redefinition, been sold below fair market 
value, and been totally mismanaged by 
Indian agents. Bands have also had their 
funds lost, stolen, and mismanaged. All of 
these form the basis for claims.
It ought not to be surprising then that reserve lands,
such as those guaranteed under Treaty 3, were under
* Brad Morse, Current Issues in Aboriginal and Treaty 
Rights eds. William Henderson, Brad Morse (Ottawa: University of 
Ottawa, 1984), p.60.
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constant threat of exploitation, largely because the 
government’s primary concern was for increased economic 
devel opment. ***
Clearly the federal government did not perform 
well in this situation, either in preventing the 
construction of the dam until the effects of the 
flooding on the Native community were known, or in 
protecting and promoting the rights of the Native 
people to seek compensation after the flooding.
Through the special arrangement of Treaty 3, Native 
people were given the right to choose which lands they 
wanted to inhabit throughout most of the year and which 
would be set aside as wild lands for seasonal use. The 
federal government was obligated to reserve those lands 
for the use of Aboriginal people, yet, the Department 
of Indian Affairs parcelled up whatever land was needed 
by commercial interests, in this case, for the 
Minnesota and Ontario Power Company, without ensuring 
that the profits from such arrangements would be 
utilized to benefit Native people living in that 
region. In addition, the lake front lands which were 
damaged because of the flooding were sold as cottage 
lots to the people of the town of Fort Frances, and the 
profit from the sale of those reserve lands went to the
Morris Zaslow, The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870- 
1914 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), p.149.
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government. Moreover, much of the remaining land was 
ruined because of the flooding, and whatever use of 
that land Native people ! originally intended for it, 
was now made impossible. The government did this, 
without consulting Native people, without advising them 
of their rights to that land, and without compensating 
them for the loss of that land.
Throughout the history of Native-white relations 
in Canada, as demonstrated in this case, it seems clear 
that the there was no genuine understanding of, or 
commitment to uphold, the intent of the treaties on the 
part of the federal government when confronted with 
provincial, business or settler demands. The treaties 
were initiated out of a desire for peace and to secure 
land, they were maintained through a need to subjugate 
and control, and they were subverted by every level of 
government because of greed.
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